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general	health screening	program	on	individuals 	health	status	and	health	care	cost 	To	




s a v i n g s 	i n 	t h e 	o u t p a t i e n t 	s e c t o r   	w h e r e a s 	i n 	t h e 	l o n g 	r u n   	n o 	s tatistically	 significant	
effects	 of	 screening	 on	 either	 health	 care	 cost	 component	 could	 be	 discerned 	 In	
summary 	screening	participation	increases	health	care	costs 	Since	we	did	not	find	any	
statistically	significant	effect	of	screening	participation	on	insurants 	health	status	at	any	
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early	disease	detection	 secondary	prevention  	they	also	provide	the	opportunity	for	screening	
participants	 to	 change	 unhealthy	 lifestyles	 through	 the	 so called	 lifestyle	 counseling	  primary	
prevention  	Consequently 	participants 	long term	health	outcomes	are	expected	to	improve 	and	
future	health	care	costs	should	decrease 	However 	more	recently 	screening	programs	have	faced	
heavy	criticism 	Opponents	emphasize	a	list	of	contra arguments 	They	argue	that	in	many	cases 	
the	effectiveness	of	screening	is	limited	and	that	screening	costs	will	exceed	associated	savings 	
Screening	may	produce	false	positive	outcomes	that	result	in	overtreatment 	This	may	not	only	
increase	short term	but	also	long term	health	care	costs 	Moreover 	several	screening	procedures	
may	themselves	entail	potential	harm	 e g  	due	to	radiation	exposure 	or	considerable	discomfort	
for	patients	 e g  	as	in	the	case	of	a	colonoscopy  	According	to	the	latter	arguments 	different	
health	organizations	have	recently	revised	their	screening	guidelines 	
Typically 	 these	 screening	 guidelines	 are	 based	 on	 two	 strands	 of	 medical	 and	
epidemiological	literature 	One	branch	analyzes	the	selection	process	of	patients	into	the	screening	
programs 	 Summing	 up	 this	 extensive	 body	 of	 literature 	 one	 can	p u t 	f o r w a r d 	t h a t 	s c r e e n i n g 	
participants	are positively	selected	on	socioeconomic	characteristics 	Moreover 	there	is	evidence	
t h a t 	e s p e c i a l l y 	h e a l t h y 	p e o p l e 	a s 	w e l l 	a s 	t h o s e 	w i t h 	a 	f a m i l y 	h istory	 of	 particular illnesses 
participate  	T h e 	o t h e r 	s t r a n d 	o f 	l i t e r a t u r e 	d e a l s 	w i t h 	t h e 	e f f e c t i v e n e s s 	o f 	 screening	 programs 	
Typically 	 randomized	 control	 trial s	  R C T s   	a r e 	u s e d 	t o 	e v a l u a t e	 the	 effectiveness	 of	 screening	
programs  	Based	on	this	medical	and	epidemiological	evidence 	screening	guidelines	and	their	
                                                 
 	Screening	might	be	defined	as	the	active	search	for	a	disease	 or	a	pre disease	condition 	in	patients	who	
are	presumed	and	presume	themselves	to	be	healthy	 Holland	and	Stewart	      	In	such	a	setting 	screening	
is 	in	general 	not	able	to	reduce	the	likelihood	of	a	certain	disease 	however 	it	may	reduce	its	negative	
consequences 	Therefore 	screening	is	usually	considered	as	a	form	of	secondary	prevention 	In	cases	where	
screening	programs	incorporate	aspects	of	health	counseling 	it	also	constitutes	primary	prevention  
 	Jepson	et	al 	      	provides	an	extensive	survey	on	determinants	of	screening	participation 	Compare	also	
Aas	       	Blom	et	al 	       	Fukuda	et	al 	       	Lange	       	Meissner	et	al 	       	Sabates	and	
Feinstein	       	Selvin	and	Brett	       	Sambamoorthi	and	McAlpine	       	Whynes	et	al 	       	or	
Park	and	Kang	      	for	more	recent	studies  
 	Actual	recommendations	of	the	U S 	Preventive	Services	Task	Force	are 	for	instance 	based	on	Andriole	et	al 	
      	and	Schröder	et	al 	      	for	prostate cancer	screenings 	Nyström	et	al 	      	and	Tabár	      	for	
breast	cancer	screening 	or	Hardcastle	et	al 	      	and	Mandel	et	al 	      	for	colorectal	cancer	screening 	
Raffle	and	Gray	      	presents	state of the art	studies	for	RCTs	 e g  	UK	Collaborative	Trial	of	Ovarian	
Cancer	 Screening  	an d	ot he r	more 	di s pu te d 	me th o ds	i n 	the 	cl i n i cal 	re al m 	t h at 	hav e 	b e e n 	u s e d 	t o 	b r i n g	
evidence	 of	 the	 impact	 of	 screening	 programs	  e g  	 so called	 case	 control	 studies	 or	 long term	 trend	
analysis    	
 
changes	over	time	leave	the	overall	impression	that 	 as	compared	to	 previous	periods 	contra 
arguments	have	been	given	a	higher	priority	more	recently  	
In	this	paper 	we	evaluate	an	Austrian	mass	screening	program	launched	in	     	Every	
A u s t r i a n 	a d u l t 	i s 	i n v i t e d 	t o 	u n d e r g o 	a n 	a n n u a l 	h e a l t h 	s c r e e n i n g 	 offered	 by	 her his	 general	
practitioner	 GP  	the	financial	costs	of	which	are	fully	covered	by	statutory	health	insurance 	The	
screening	 process	 comprises	 a	 general	 health	 examination	 and	 some	 age 	 and	 sex specific	
c o m p o n e n t s   	L a b o r a t o r y 	t e s t s 	a n d 	t h e 	d e t e r m i n a t i o n 	o f 	b e h a v i o r a l	 risk	 factors	  based	 on	 the	
insurants 	medical	history 	should	help	to	detect	cardiovascular	diseases 	In	addition	to	this	form	of	
secondary	 prevention 	 participation	 is	 expected	 to	 motivate	 insurants	 to	 engage	 in	 primary	
prevention 	
Our	analysis	is	based	on	a	matched	patient GP	panel	data	set	comprising	all	private	sector	
employees	and	their	dependents	from	the	state	of	Upper	Austria	covering	the	period	from	    	
through	     	This	data	set	allowed	us	to	estimate	the	effect	of	screening	participation	on	a	number	
of	health	outcomes	such	as	outpatient	health	care	costs 	the	incidence	of	hospitalization	and	sick	
leave 	 and	 mortality 	 In	 order	 to	 solve	 the	 problem	 of	 self selection	 into	 treatment 	 we	 took	
advantage	of	the	fact	that	GPs	have	an	incentive	to	 sell 	the	screening	exams	to	their	patients 	In	
particular 	we	suggest	an	instrumental	variable	 IV 	estimation	strategy	that	utilized	exogenous	
variation	 in	 screening	 participation	 due	 to	 supply determined	 screening	 recommendations 	 To	




For	the	average	insurant 	we	observed	an	increase	in	outpatient	health	expenditures	 by	  	
percent	in	the	year	of	screening	participation	and	by	  	percent	in	the	following	year 	and	of	
inpatient	health	care	costs	 by	about	  	percent  	In	the	 medium	run 	outpatient	 expenditures	
decreased	by	  	percent	in	the	third	year	after	treatment 	and	by	  	percent	in	the	fourth	and	fifth	
years 	We	neither	found	long run	effects	on	health	care	cost	nor	observed	any	effects	on	the	health	
status	variables	days	of	sick	leave	and	mortality 	In	summary 	we	did	not	observe	 overall	cost	
savings	or	any	positive	effects	on	health	for	the	average	insurant 	These	patterns	are	quite	robust	
across	different	sub samples	of	the	population 	However 	given	that	the	short run	increase	in	health	
expenditures	is	comparably	low	for	younger	insurants	 around	sixty	years	of	age	or	younger  	we	
found	some	evidence	for	overall	cost saving	potentials	for	this	group 	
                                                 
 	F o r 	i n s t a n c e   	t h e 	U S 	 Preventive	 Services	 Task	 Force	 has	 released	 new	 guidelines	 for	 breast	 cancer	
screening	by	    	 USPSTF	      	Whereas	previous	recommendations	for	screening	mammography	were	
for	screening	every	one	to	two	years	after	the	age	of	  	years 	the	new	recommendations	call	for	participation	
only	after	the	age	of	  	years 	Or 	the	American	Cancer	Society	takes	a	clear	position	discouraging	mass	
population	screening	and	encouraging	doctors	to	inform	their	patients	about	screening	uncertainties	and	to	
involve	them	more	in	the	decision making	process	 Smith	et	al 	        	
 
This	paper	extends	the	existing	literature	on	the	effectiveness	of	screening	as	follows 	 i 	
While	the	literature	on	cost	effectiveness	of	mass	screenings	takes	into	account	direct	costs	of	




sickness	fund	over	a	period	of	  	years 	Therefore 	we	provide	a	more	comprehensive	analysis	of	
potential	financial	consequences	of	screening	participation 	 ii 	Compared	to	existing	literature 	for	
all	participants	and	non participants 	we	observed	the	universe	of	health service	utilization	that	
allowed	us	to	study	a	broad	variety	of	outcome	variables	 e g  	expenses	for	medical	attendance	and	
drugs 	hospitalization 	sick	leave 	and	mortality  	This	enabled	a	more	comprehensive	evaluation	of	
health	 screening 	  iii 	 The	 administrative	 panel	 data	 provided	 i n 	t h e 	r e g i s t e r 	o f 	t h e 	r e g i o n a l 	
s i c k n e s s 	f u n d 	c o v e r 	    	p e r c e n t 	o f 	t h e 	p o p u l a t i o n 	i n 	t h e 	s t a t e 	o f	 Upper	 Austria	 and	 made	 an	
evaluation	of	screening	participation	in	general	medical	practice	possible 	 iv 	Finally 	the	Austrian	
Bismarckian type	health	care	system	represents	a	good	example	for	countries	with	universal	health	
care	 where	 anyone	 is	 eligible	 to	 participate	 in	 a	 health	 screening	 examination	 once	 a	 year 	
Consequently 	we	did	not	expect	sample	selection	based	on	financial	constraints	of	the	patients 	
	 The	remainder	of	the	paper	is	organized	as	 follows 	In	Section	   	we	st a rt 	wit h	a	brie f	
description	 of	 the	 institutional	 setting 	 Section	  	 presents	 the	 data	 and	 descriptive	 statistics 	
T h e r e a f t e r   	w e 	e x p l a i n 	o u r 	e s t i m a t i o n 	s t r a t e g y 	a n d 	d i s c u s s 	t h e 	identifying	 assumptions	 of	 our	
empirical	strategy	in	Section	  	Section	 	reports	the	main	empirical	results	and	presents	several	





Austria	 is	 a	 particularly	 useful	 case	 to	 study	 the	 effectiveness	 of	 screening	 participation 	 It	
represents	a	Bismarckian type	 social 	health	insurance	system	and	offers	a	nationwide	health 
screening	 program 	 Every	 resident	 is	 covered	 by	 mandatory	 health	 insurance 	 Depending	 on	
occupation	and	place	of	residence 	individuals	are	insured	with	one	of	  	regional	sickness	funds  	
Most	sickness	funds	cover	all	costs	 associated	 with	sickness	and	ma t e rn it y  	a n d	som e 	of 	t he m	
charge	a	small	deductible	or	copayment  	In	all	funds 	a	visit	to	a	GP	for	a	referral	to	a	medical	
specialist	is	recommended 	however 	there	is	no	obligation	to	do	so 	and	more	and	more	specialists	
are	consulted	directly	by	the	patients 	
                                                 
 	Due	to	historical	reasons 	the	division	is	not	only	regional	but	also	occupational  
 	The	Upper	Austrian	Sickness	Fund	 whose	data	we	use	below 	does	not	charge	deductibles	or	copayments   	
 
Every	insurant	   	years	of	age	or	older 	is	invited	to	undergo	a	voluntary	health	screening	
once	a	year 	This	screening	examination	is	conducted	by	a	GP	and	is	fully	covered	by	mandatory	
health	insurance	without	any	extra	payment	by	patients 	The	screening	examination	includes	a	
g e n e r a l 	h e a l t h 	c h e c k 	a n d 	s e v e r a l 	a g e   	a n d 	s e x   s p e c i f i c 	d i a g n o s t i c 	s e r v i c e s   	T h e 	g e n e r a l 	h e a l t h 	
examination	consists	of	laboratory	tests	to	monitor	blood	sugar 	uric	acid 	triglycerides 	cholesterol 	
gamma	GT 	and	measurement	of	body	mass	index 	Based	on	a	short	anamneses	questionnaire 	the	
insurant s	own	and	family	medical	history 	frequency	of	physical	activity 	alcohol	consumption 	and	
cigarette	smoking	is	determined 	This	information	is	the	basis	for	the	GP	to	identify	behavioral	risk	
factors	 and	 to	 motivate	 the	 patient	 to	 engage	 in	 primary	 prevention	  life style	 counseling  	
Concerning	 alcohol	 abuse	 and	 smoking 	 assistance	 is	 provided	 in	 reducing	 alcohol	 intake	 and	
smoking	 cessation 	 Obese	 patients	 get	 nutritional	 counseling 	 The	 program	 primarily	 aims	 to	
prevent	or	detect	cardiovascular	disease	at	an	early	presymptomatic	stage	in	order	to	reduce	future	
health	 care	 costs	 and	 improve	 insurants 	 quality	 of	 life 	 Depending	 on	 age	 and	 sex 	 several	
additional	examinations	may	be	recommended	by	the	examining	GP  	
As	Figure	 	shows 	annual	screening	participation	has	steadily	increased	since	the	nineties  	
While	 only	 about	 six	 percent	 of	 all	 male	 insurants	 and	 seven	 percent	 of	 all	 female	 insurants	
participated	in	the	year	     	the	participation	rate	increased	to	thirteen	and	fourteen	percent	
respectively	 in	      	 To	 put	 these	 numbers	 into	 perspective 	 it	m u s t 	b e 	n o t e d 	t h a t 	v e r y 	f e w 	
insurants	participate	in	the	screening	every	year 	For	instance 	in	the	state	of	Upper	Austria 	the	
majority	 about	  	percent 	of	attendees	only	participated	once	or	twice	over	a	ten year	period 	
About	six	percent	showed	up	every	second	year 	and	less	than	one	percent	attended	every	year 	
The	direct	costs	of	the	health screening	program	are	substantial 	For	instance 	in	     	the	
sickness	funds	spent	more	than	  	million	Euros	on	screenings	of	about	       	insurants 	this	is	
equivalent	to	    	percent	of	the	total	health	care	cost	 or	     	percent	of	GDP  	This	figure	only	
includes	the	cost	for	the	general	health	examination	and	accounts	for	neither	the	additional	age 	
and	sex specific	components	nor	further	referrals	to	medical	specialists 	In	general 	participation	






                                                 
 	In	detail 	the	program	comprises	the	following 	  	years	or	older 	counseling	and	education	concerning	
breast	 cancer 	 recommendation	 of	 a	 supplementary	 mammography 	   	 years	 and	 older 	 counseling	 and	
education	 concerning	 colorectal	 cancer 	 performing	 a	 fecal	 occult	 blood	 test 	 recommendation	 of	 a	
supplementary	colonoscopy 	  	years	and	older 	special	examinations	of	hearing	and	vision  
 	Females	are	more	likely	to	participate	in	screenings 	this	is	also	confirmed	by	a	regression	analysis	using	the	





state	of	Upper	Austria   	We	used	the	database	of	the	Upper	Austrian	Sickness	Fund	to	compile	a	
matched	insurant GP	panel	data	set	for	all	insurants	who	were	born	before	     	Our	data	set	
covers	the	period	from	    	through	       	In	order	to	assign	a	GP	to	each	insurant 	we	used	the	
patients 	GP	consultation	record 	For	each	year 	we	determined	the	GP	who	was	most	frequented	by	
the	insurant   	On	average 	an	insurant	had	   	GP	consultations	per	year	 the	median	is	equal	to	
     	provided	by	   	different	GPs 	During	years	i n	which	an	insurant	 had	no	GP	consultation	
 about	    	percent	of	all	observations  	we	assigned	the	GP	from	the	preceding	 or	if	not	available 	
from	the	succeeding 	year s  	The	nature	of	the	matched	insurant GP	panel	data	implies	that	we	
had	to	exclude	all	insurants	    	percent 	from	our	analysis	who	had	never	consulted	a	GP	in	Upper	
Austria	during	their	insurance	spell s    	
Obviously 	our	panel	is	not	balanced 	Individuals	dropped	out	of	our	sample	if	they	were	no	
longer	insured	with	the	Upper	Austrian	Sickness	Fund 	if	they	moved	outside	Upper	Austria 	or	if	
they	passed	away 	Equivalently 	individuals	born	before	    	entered	into	our	panel	if	they	joined	
the	Upper	Austrian	Sickness	Fund	and	resided	in	Upper	Austria	after	     	Still 	the	vast	majority	of	
insurants	     	percent 	in	our	sample	could	be	observed	in	each	year 	
Our	 data	 set	 includes	 information	 on	 all	 covered	 health	 services	  including	 screening	
participation 	that	had	been	provided	to	an	insurant	by	his her	GP	or	any	other	resident	medical	
s p e c i a l i s t   	T h a t 	m e a n s 	t h a t 	w e 	o b s e r v e d 	e a c h 	s i n g l e 	d o c t o r 	v i s i t	 and	 each	 drug	 that	 had	 been	
prescribed 	and	with	the	exact	date	of	service	utilization 	The	data	set	also	provides	information	on	
the	incidence	of	hospitalization	and	sick	leave 	In	order	to	obtain	exact	information	on	the	place	of	
residence	 zip	code	area  	labor	market	status 	and	mortality 	we	linked	our	data	to	the	Austrian	
Social	Security	Database	and	the	database	from	the	Austrian	Federal	Ministry	of	Finance 	
	 To	evaluate	the	effectiveness	of	health	screening 	we	considered	the	following	outcomes	in	
our	 estimation	 analysis	 below 	 outpatient	 health	 care	 expenditures	 including	 cost	 for	 medical	
                                                 
  	Upper	Austria	is	one	of	nine	states	in	Austria	and	comprises	about	one	sixth	of	the	Austrian	population	and	
work	 force 	 From	 the	 total	 population	  about	           	 we	 observed	          	 insured	 private	 sector	
employees	with	their	dependents 	Out	of	this	group 	we	focused	on	       	persons	born	in	    	or	earlier 	
From	this	sample 	       	persons	      	percent 	had	at	least	participated	once	in	a	screening	program 	
The	remaining	       	      	percent 	never	joined	the	screening	program 	
  	Therefore 	at	the	beginning	of	our	observation	period 	the	included	insurants	were	  	years	of	age	or	older 	
For	younger	people 	health	expenditures	are	mainly	driven	by	accidents	or	genetically	disposed	diseases 	
Both	aspects	are	not	covered	by	the	screening	program  
  	If	an	insurant	had	consulted	two	 or	more 	GPs	equally	often	in	a	given	year 	we	picked	the	most	recently	
consulted	one  
  	Since	these	insurants	had	comparably	shorter	insurance	spells 	they	accounted	for	only	   	percent	of	the	
observations   	
 
attendance	and	medical	drugs 	days	of	hospitalization 	days	of	sick	leave 	and	mortality   	As	Table	
 	shows 	the	average	insurant	generated	      	Euro	of	outpatient	health	expenditures	per	year 	
spent	    	days	in	the	hospital 	and	was	on	sick	leave	 conditional	on	employment 	for	     	days 	
As	expected 	in	each	category 	the	mean	and	the	standard	deviation	increased	with	age   	By	the	







                                                   	 
 
where     denotes	the	health	outcome	of	insurant	i in	period	t 	The	binary	variable s 	      	capture	
whether	individual	i participated	in	a	health	screening	in	period	t-r	with	r	 	                    	As	
covariates 	we	included	time varying	characteristics	of	the	insurants	 denoted	by	xit  	insurants	
fixed	effects	     	GP	fixed	effects	         	and	time	fixed	effects	     	The	parameters	of	primary	
interest	are	   	indicating	the	effect	of	screening	r	years	ago 	
An	obvious	issue	is	the	endogeneity	of	screening	participation 	Self selection	into	treatment	
has	to	be	expected 	In	other	words 	a	correlation	between	s     	and	the	error	term	   	is	highly	likely 	
A	priori 	it	is	hard	to	assess	the	sign	of	the	selection	bias 	It	is	reasonable	to	believe	that	health 
conscious	individuals	are	more	likely	to	participate 	In	that	case 	OLS	would	overestimate	the	effect	
of	health	screening 	At	the	same	time 	it	would	be	rational	for	individuals	from	high risk	groups	to	
undergo	a	check up	on	a	regular	basis 	If	the	latter	effect	dominates 	OLS	would	underestimate	the	
effect	of	screening   	
	 Selection	that	is	based	on	insurants 	observed	characteristics	or	unobserved	time invariant	
heterogeneity	 is	 controlled	 for	 b y 	t h e 	i n c l u s i o n 	o f 	t h e 	v e c t o r 	of	 time varying	 individual	
characteristics	and	the	insurants 	fixed	effects 	However 	if	screening	participation	is	correlated	
with	 time varying	 unobservables	 that	 affect	 health	 outcomes 	 no control strategy succeeds in 
                                                 
  	The	cost	of	screening	participation	has	been	deducted	from	outpatient	health	care	expenditures	Days	of	
hospitalization	were	used	as	a	proxy	for	inpatient	health	care	expenditure 	The	analysis	of	sick	leave	was	
restricted	 to	 the	 sample	 of	 insurants	 with	 employment	 spells 	 Moreover 	 sick	 leave	 was	 only	 measured	
precisely	for	sickness	absences	that	lasted	longer	than	 	days 	It	is	not	mandatory	for	employees	or	firms	to	
notify	the	Upper	Austrian	Sickness	Fund	of	sickness	absences	lasting	less	than	 	days 	
  	N o t e 	t h a t 	t h i s 	d o e s 	n o t 	a p p l y 	t o 	s i c k 	l e a v e 	f o r 	t h e 	t w o 	h i g h e s t	 age	 groups 	 Since	 average	 effective	
retirement	age	in	the	year	    	was	    	for	males	and	    	for	females	 Source 	OECD	Database  	the	
remaining	insurants	in	the	sample	are	positively	selected  
  	There	is	extensive	medical	and	epidemiological	literature	available	that	confirms	this	positive	selection	into	






    	Supply determined	screening	demand	
The	idea	of	our	IV	strategy	was	to	utilize	exogenous	variation	in	screening	participation	due	to	
supply determined	demand 	In	other	words 	we	took	advantage	of	the	fact	that	patients	do	not	only	
self select	into	screening	but	are	also	examined	simply	because	of	their	GPs 	recommendation 	In	
fact 	there	are	good	reasons	to	believe	that	this	market	is	mainly	driven	by	the	supply	side 	To	
motivate	this	approach 	we	discuss	in	a	first	step	why	GPs	in	Austria	should	have	a	strong	incentive	




well being 	This	type	of	supply determined	health	demand	is	fully	altruistic	and	solely	guided	by	
the	 Hippocratic	 Oath 	 Moreover 	 GPs	 may	 also	 act	 in	 their	 own	 interest 	 as	 they	 recommend	
screening	that	is	driven	by	their	profit maximizing	behavior	 McGuire	      	In	a	static	setting 	GPs	
have	a	clear	financial	incentive	to	sell	screenings   	Supply determined	recommendations	may	be	
particularly	strong	in	the	case	of	screening 	since	this	service	can	be	sold	to	any	patient 	healthy	or	
unhealthy 	 with	 a	 low	 probability	 of	 medical	 liability	 due	 to	 overtreatment 	 To	 put	 it	 bluntly 	
screening	is	the	only	service	by	which	a	GP	can	officially	earn	income	with	perfectly	healthy	people 	
At	least	in	Austria 	screening	also	seems	to	be	a	comparably	lucrative	business 	Table	 	provides	
frequencies	and	fees	paid	from	the	Upper	Austrian	Sickness	Fund	to	the	GPs	for	different	health	
care	 services 	 It	 can	 be	 seen	 that	 the	 reimbursement	 for	 general	 consultation 	 including	 extra	
payments	from	the	third	visit	of	a	patient	in	a	quarter 	makes	up	to	  	percent	of	the	GPs	total	
income   	Screening	accounts	for	almost	 	percent	of	the	total	amount	of	fees 	Although	we	do	not	
have	detailed	information	on	the	doctors 	time	spent	for	the	different	service	categories 	Table	 	
also	indicates	that	a	GP	can	earn	relatively	good	money	by	providing	screening	examinations 	The	
screening	fee	is	more	than	four	times	higher	than	that	for	the	first	treatment	in	a	quarter 	and	




                                                 
  	In	a	dynamic	setting 	it	could	be	optimal	for	GPs	to	undersupply	preventive	care	measures	in	order	to	reap	
higher	profits	from	curative	care	measures	in	the	future	 Kenkel	       
  	 A	 GP	 can	 have	 contracts	 with	 several	 health	 insurance	 funds 	 Th e 	f u n d s 	a r e 	v e r y 	s i m i l a r 	i n 	t h e i r 	f e e 	
structure 	and	the	funds 	GP	fees	generate	most	of	a	GP s	income 	  	
 
Do	patients	respond	to	GPs 	screening	recommendations 	The	conjecture	that	screening	
participation	is	highly	driven	by	GPs 	recommendations	is	confirmed	in	the	literature 	For	instance 	
Cole	et	al 	      	analyzed	the	effectiveness	of	three	different	letter	designs	for	colorectal	cancer	
screening	invitations 	The	first	letter	was	dispatched	from	a	central	screening	service 	the	second	
included	a	reference	to	the	patient s	GP 	and	the	third	was	also	signed	by	the	GP 	It	turns	out	that	
the	participation	rate	was	lowest	among	patients	who	received	the	first	letter	   	percent 	and	
highest	among	the	third	group	   	percent  	This	and	similar	evidence  	suggests	that	patients	
respond	to	GPs 	screening	recommendations 	
In	line	with	this	evidence 	we	found	in	our	data	that	GP	fixed	effects	alone	explain	about	
eight	percent	of	the	variation	in	individual	screening	participation 	Patient	fixed	effects 	however 	
account	 for	 only	     	 percent	 of	 the	 variation	 in	 screening	 participation 	 This	 suggests	 that	
screening	 participation	 is	 predominantly	 driven	 by	 GPs	 and	 only	 to	 a	 small	 extent	 by	 patients	
themselves 	
	
    	Quantifying	supply determined	screening	recommendations	
Ideally 	we	would	like	a	random	sample	of	GPs	recommending	screening	to	a	random	sample	of	all	
their	patients 	and	we	could	observe	this	and	their	subsequent	health	outcomes	in	our	data   	Since	
this	type	of	field	experiment	is	not	feasible 	we	suggest	using	a	proxy	for	the	intensity	of	exposure	
to	 GP	 screening	 recommendations 	 In	 particular 	 we	 argue	 that	 the	 number	 of	 prescribed	
screenings	 by	 GPs	 located	 in	 a	 given	 zip	 code	 area	 provides	  wit h i n 	a 	p a n e l 	d a t a 	r e g r e s s i o n 	
framework 	a	good	proxy	for	exposure	to	supply determined	recommendations 	
W e 	w a n t e d 	t o 	c a p t u r e 	t h e 	s i m p l e 	i d e a 	t h a t 	i n s u r a n t s 	a r e 	m o r e 	e x posed	 to	 supply 
determined	screening	recommendations	if	the	consulted	GPs	are	more	likely	 for	whatever	reason 	
to	advocate	this	service	to	their	patients 	If	we	were	willing	to	assume	that	insurants	had	been	
randomly	 assigned	 to	 GPs 	 we	 could	 simply	 use	 GP	 fixed	 effects	 a s 	a n 	I V 	f o r 	s c r e e n i n g 	
participation   	In	order	to	relax	this	assumption 	and	to	allow	for	a	setting	where	insurants	may	
actively	select	a	particular	GP	within	their	local	neighborhood 	we	suggest	measuring	the	exposure	
to	 supply determined	 screening	 recommendations	 not	 on	 a	 GP	 level	 but	 on	 zip code	 level   	
Another	 advantage	 to	 this	 procedure	 is	 that	 we	 were	 able	 to	 include	 GP	 fixed	 effects	 in	 our	
                                                 
  	See 	for	instance 	Meissner	et	al 	       	Richardson	et	al 	       	Bowman	et	al 	       	Cole	et	al 	       	
Cowen	et	al 	       	 
  	This	would	allow	us	to	use	the	randomly	assigned	screening	recommendation	as	an	IV	for	actual	screening	
participation 	Given	that	a	reasonably	large	fraction	of	patients	follow	their	GPs 	advice	 i e  	there	is	a	 strong	
first	stage   	we	could	estimate	the	causal	effect	 in	particular 	a	local	average	treatment	effect 	of	screening	
participation	on	subsequent	health	outcomes	for	those	patients	who	comply	with	their	GP s	recommendation  
  	In	fact 	the	spatial	distribution	of	GPs	possessing	a	contract	with	the	Upper	Austrian	Sickness	Fund	is	likely	
close	to	random 	Since	such	a	contract	is	highly	attractive 	GPs	queue	for	it 	and	have	a	strong	financial	
incentive	to	accept	available	offers 	even	if	this	is	from	outside	their	initial	place	of	residence  
  	This	resembles	the	typical	situation	in	Austria 	where	insurants	have	a	GP	in	their	local	neighborhood	
 about	    	percent	of	insurants	have	a	GP	within	their	zip	code  	whom	they	consult	to	get	basic	medical	
care	or	sick	leave	slips	for	their	employer    	
 
regression	analysis	that	captured	all	unmeasured	time invariant	GP	characteristics 	In	particular 	
we	calculated	our	IV	 denoted	by	          	for	each	zip	code	area	z	and	year	t	as	the	sum	of	all	
screenings	prescribed	by	all	GPs	located	in	a	given	zip	code	area	 consumed	by	any	insurant	minus	
the	screening	of	individual	i 	divided	by	all	insurants	residing	in	this	zip	code	area	minus	one 	
	 The	spatial	distribution	of	our	IV	averaged	over	annual	values	from	    	through	    	is	





    	 IV	estimation	
Our	suggested	IV	strategy	translates	into	the	following	first stage	estimation 	
	
                                                      	 
	
We	will	see	below	that	this	proxy	for	the	intensity	of	exposure	to	supply side driven	screening	
         	 in	 the	 residential	 zip	 code	 area	 z	 is	 highly	 correlated	 with	 the	 individual	 screening	
participation 	and	that	the	parameter	 	enters	as	a	highly	statistically	significant	determinant 	The	
inclusion	of	GP	fixed	effects	  	allows	for	the	direct	influence	of	GPs	on	patients 	health	outcomes	
that	are	potentially	correlated	with	the	extent	of	GPs	advising	screening 	For	instance 	GPs	who	like	
to	recommend	screening	may	also	tend	to	prescribe	more	 or	more	expensive 	medical	drugs 	
	 In	order	to	 evaluate	the	validity	of	 our	IV 	it	is	useful	to	highlight	the	 exact	sources	of	
variation	in	the	first	stage 	In	our	framework 	patients	experienced	a	variation	in	the	intensity	of	
exposure	to	supply determined	screening	recommendation	 i 	if	an	existing	GP	in	a	zip	code	area	is	
substituted	 e g  	due	to	retirement  	 ii 	if	an	additional	GP	is	allocated 	 iii 	if	patients	move	to	
another	zip	code	area 	and	 iv 	if	existing	GPs	change	their	screening	recommendation	behavior	
over	time 	The	latter	may	be	triggered	by	a	re evaluation	of	GPs 	assessment	of	the	effectiveness	of	
screenings	 e g  	due	to	training 	and or	by	changing	financial	incentives	to	sell	screenings 	Our	
proxy	of	exposure	to	supply determined	screening	may	also	be	altered	 v 	if	other	patients	of	GPs	
within	a	certain	zip	code	area	request	more	screenings	without	any	GPs 	intervention 	While	it	is	
not	possible	to	disentangle	and	quantify	each	of	different	channels	of	variation 	we	expect	the	fifth	
channel	to	be	comparatively	less	important   	It	can	be	shown	that	GP	fixed	effects	explain	   	
times	more	variation	as	compared	to	insurant	fixed	effects 	In	other	words 	this	suggests	that	this	
market	can	be	characterized	by	Say s	law 	and	most	demand	is	determined	by	its	supply 	
                                                 
23 We observed 91.80 percent of our GPs in each year over the whole sample period. At least 5.64 percent of GPs 
left the sample (via retirement or death), and 2.56 percent joined the sample at a later point in time. Moreover, 20.30 
percent of insurants moved across zip code areas within Upper Austria at least once.   	
 
	 The	first	four	 and	supposedly	quantitatively	most	important 	sources	of	variation	seem	
undoubtedly	exogenous	and	should	not	affect	insurants 	later	health	outcomes	through	channels	
other	than	screening	participation 	What	about	variation	due	to	the	fifth	channel 	This	type	of	
variation	 would	 only	 be	 problemati c 	i f 	a u t o n o m o u s l y 	i n c r e a s e d 	s creening	 demand	 by	 other	
insurants	    	of	GPs	in	the	same	zip	code	area	has	an	independent	effect	on	insurant s	   	later	
health	outcomes 	While	it	is	possible	that	family	members	and	other	peers	persuade	one	to	follow	
their	 example	 to	 participate	 in	 screening	 and	 to	 change	 others 	 health	 behavior 	 we	 consider	
herding	phenomena	in	single	zip	code	areas	that	are	large	enough	to	create	substantial	variation	in	
our	IV	to	be	highly	unlikely 	In	sum 	given	that	we	control	for	GP	and	insurant	fixed	effects	 among	
others 	in	our	regression	framework 	we	regard	a	correlation	between	our	IV	and	the	error	term	in	
the	second	stage	as	highly	unlikely 	
	 Under	the	validity	of	our	IV	approach 	we	can	then	identify	a	local	average	treatment	effect 	
This	means	that	we	estimated	the	causal	effect	of	screening	participation	on	later	health	outcomes	
for	 insurants	 who	 participated	 in	 health	 screenings	 due	 to	 their 	h i g h 	e x p o s u r e 	t o 	s u p p l y  
determined	screening	recommendations 	In	other	words 	we	can	think	of	the	compliers	as	those	





This	 section	 presents	 our	 estimation	 results 	 We	 begin	 by	 provid i n g 	f i r s t   s t a g e 	r e s u l t s   	
Subsequently 	we	discuss	the	estimated	effects	of	screening	participation	on	our	main	measures	of	
health	care	cost	 outpatient	expenditures	including	costs	for	medical	attendance	and	medical	drugs	
and	incidence	of	hospitalization 	and	health	status	 incidence	of	sick	leave	and	mortality  	It	turns	
out	to	be	useful	to	distinguish	here	between	short  	medium  	and	long run	effects	of	screening	
participation 	 Moreover 	 we	 present	 disaggregated	 estimation	 results	 for	 medical	 attendance	
 where	 we	 distinguish	 between	 different	 medical	 specialists 	 and	 for	 different	 categories	 of	
medical	drugs	to	provide	further	insights 	
Table	 	summarizes	the	first stage	results	for	the	different	lags	in	our	IV	estimations 	Given	
that	the	outcome	days	of	sick	leave	applies	only	to	employed	insurants 	we	used	two	different	
samples 	the	full	sample	and	the	sub sample	of	insurants	with	employment	spells 	In	both	samples 	
we	found	a	highly	statistically	significant	effect	of	our	IV	 i e  	the	proxy	for	the	exposure	to	supply 
side	 screening	 recommendations 	 on	 the	 likelihood	 of	 screening	 participation 	 The	 estimated	
coefficients	of	the	instrument	range	between	    	and	    	for	the	full	sample	and	between	    	
and	    	for	the	restricted	sample 	This	means	that	an	increase	in	the	instrument	 screening	rate	
p e r 	z i p 	c o d e 	a r e a   	b y 	o n e 	s t a n d a r d 	d e v i a t i o n 	              	i n c r e a s e d 	an	 insurant s	 propensity	 to	
participate	in	a	health	screening	by	    	percentage	points	if	we	assume	a	first stage	coefficient	of	  	
 
    	The	F statistic	on	the	excluded	instrument	is	very	high	for	each	lag 	indicating	that	we	can	
reject	the	hypothesis	of	a	weak	instrument	 Stock	and	Yogo 	      	
The	 second stage	 results	 of	 our	 IV	 estimations	 for	 our	 main	 outcome	 variables	 are	
summarized	in	Table	  	along	with	the	respective	OLS	estimates	for	comparison 	The	coefficients	
give	the	estimated	effect	of	screening	on	the	respective	outcome	variable	r	years	after	treatment 	




not	be	interpreted	causally 	The	findings	suggest	that 	in	particular 	healthy	or	health conscious	
people	participate	in	screening 	Healthy	screeners	cause	a	moderate	increase	in	expenses	for	doctor	
visits 	spend	less	on	medical	drugs 	and	spend	fewer	days	in	the	hospital 	moreover 	the	increasing	
number	of	sickness	days	may	indicate	that	they	do	not	go	to	work	if	they	are	sick 	
Short run	 effects  	B a s e d	o n 	t h e 	I V 	e s t i m a t i o n   	we 	f o u n d 	a 	h i g h l y 	s t a t i s t ic a l l y 	significant	
increase	in	short term	outpatient	expenditures	up	to	two	years	after	the	screening	participation 	
plus	    	in	the	year	of	treatment	and	plus	    	in	the	year	thereafter 	This	is	equivalent	to	an	
increase	of	  	percent	and	  	percent 	respectively 	The	sharp	increase	in	outpatient	expenditures	
is	predominantly	due	to	a	rise	in	expenses	for	medical	drugs 	and	to	a	smaller	extent	due	to	cost	
increases	 of	 medical	 attendance 	 Expenses	 for	 medical	 drugs	 rose	 by	     	 and	      	 while	
expenses	for	medical	attendance	increased	only	by	   	and	       	In	the	short	run 	screening	
participation	also	substantially	increased	the	incidence	of	hospitalization 	We	found	an	increase	of	
one	and	a	half	days	in	the	hospital	 or	about	plus	  	percent 	in	the	year	of	the	treatment	and	in	the	
year	thereafter 	At	the	same	time 	we	did	not	find	any	statistically	significant	impact	of	screening	
participation	on	the	incidence	of	sick	leave 		
These	 results	 suggest	 that	 screening	 leads	 to	 further	 inpatient	a n d 	o u t p a t i e n t 	m e d i c a l 	
treatment	following	the	screening	exam 	The	more	disaggregated	results	 summarized	in	Table	 	






                                                 
  	W e 	a l s o 	e s t i m a t e d 	a 	s p e c i f i c a t i o n 	i n c l u d i n g 	t h e 	c o m p l e t e 	s e t 	o f	 lagged	 screening	 participation	
simultaneously 	Due	to	the	inclusion	of	lag	  	this	specification	can	only	be	applied	to	the	reduced	sample	of	
observations	from	the	years	    	and	    	   	percent	of	the	whole	sample  	Based	on	this	specification 	we	
did	not	find	a	sufficiently	strong	first	stage 	
  	 Direct	 costs	 for	 the	 screening	 programs	 of	 the	 examining	 GP	 are	 not	 included	 in	 our	 measures	 for	
outpatient	expenditures    	
 
Austrian	 screening	 program	 is	 the	 detection	 and	 prevention	 of	 cardiovascular	 diseases 	 It	 is	




thresholds 	The	rise	of	medications	for	neural	and	mental	diseases	is	surprising 	however 	since	
these	 illnesses	 are	 not	 even	 mentioned	 in	 the	 objectives	 of	 the	 screening	 program 	 This	 result	
provides	support	for	the	conclusion	that	patients	mention	their	mental	unease	in	the	course	of	a	
comprehensive	anamnesis	and 	as	a	subsequent	consequence 	the	GPs	prescribe	antipsychotics	on	a	
large	 scale 	 Further	 cost increasing	 effects	 of	 screening	 participation	 can	 be	 found	 for	 genito 
urinary	 and	 musculo skeletal	 drugs	 and	 for	 drugs	 that	 cannot	 be	 attributed	 to	 ATC	 codes	
  Missing   		
The	disaggregated	findings	for	medical	attendance	in	Table	 	show	a	strong	short term	
increase	 in	 expenditures	 for	 diagnostic	 medical	 services 	 Both	 the	 expenditures	 for	 medical	
attendance	by	radiologists	and	for	laboratory	services	increase	substantially	up	to	four	years	after	
treatment 	There	is	every	reason	to	believe	that	GPs 	who	carry	out	the	general	health	screening 	
s u b s e q u e n t l y 	r e f e r 	p a t i e n t s 	t o 	s p e c i a l i s t s 	f o r 	f u r t h e r 	a n d   o r 	m ore	 detailed	 diagnostic	 services 	
N o t a b l y   	t h e 	p o s i t i v e 	e f f e c t 	o n 	medical	 attendance	 cost	  in	 particular 	 for	 radiologists	 and	
laboratory	services 	is	highest	in	the	year	of	the	screening 	and	decreases	thereafter 		
The	decomposition	also	reveals	a	decrease	of	expenditures	for	urologists 	gynecologists 	and	
dermatologists	in	the	short	run 	Since	the	visits	at	these	medical	specialists	often	have	a	preventive	
character	 e g  	screening	for	prostate 	breast 	or	skin	cancer  	these	consultations	can	be	expected	
to	 represent	 substitutes	 to	 the	 general	screening	program	conduct e d	b y 	t he 	GPs 	T he 	n eg a t iv e 	
impacts	of	screening	participation	on	these	expenses	are	not	in	contradiction	to	this	argument	in	
the	least 	There	is	another	striking	and	surprising	result 	The	continuous	and	quantitatively	highly	
relevant	 decrease	 of	 expenditures	 for	 physiotherapy	 over	 the	 period	 zero	 to	 five	 years	 after	
screening	 is	 remarkable	 since	 these	 medical	 services	 typically	 have	 a	 rehabilitation	 character	
without	a	direct	connection	to	screening 	We	presume	some	kind	of	substitutional	relationship	
between	screening	and	physiotherapy 	however 	we	lack	a	convincing	medical	explanation	for	this	
result 	While	the	expenses	for	the	residual	category	 Other	services 	decreased	in	the	short	run 	we	
found	an	increase	in	costs	for	pulmonologist	visits 		
Medium run	 effects 	I n 	t h e 	m e d i u m 	r u n   	o u t p a t i e n t 	e x p e n d i t u r e s 	d e c r e a s e d 	d u e 	t o 	
screening	participation	 see	Table	   	The	decline	in	outpatient	expenditures	three 	four 	and	five	
years	after	treatment	was	     	     	and	     	respectively 	This	is	equivalent	to	a	decrease	of	  	
and	  	percent 	respectively 	As	in	the	short	run 	the	effect	of	screening	on	outpatient	expenditures	





group	 of	 pharmaceuticals	 for	 the	 alimentary	 tract	 and	 metabolism 	  T a b l e 	      	T h e r e 	i s 	w e a k e r 	
evidence	for	a	reduced	consumption	of	medical	drugs	targeting	the	cardiovascular	system 	The	
decomposition	of	drug	expenditures	further	shows	that	the	expenses	for	pharmaceuticals	for	blood	
and	blood forming	organs 	for	the	genito urinary	system	including	sex	hormones 	for	the	musculo 




at	GPs	and	internists	 see	Table	   	Depending	on	the	year 	we	found	cost	reductions	between	  	
and	  	percent	for	GPs	and	between	  	and	  	percent	for	internists 	Comparable	cost	can	be	
observed	for	visits	at	all	other	specialists	 see	category	 Other   	with	a	decline	of	expenditures	in	




found	in	the	screening	examination   	
Long term	effects 	In	the	long	run	 i e  	six	years	or	more	after	treatment  	we	did	not	find	
any	statistically	significant	effects	of	screening	on	outpatient	expenditures	or	on	the	incidence	of	
hospitalization	 see	Table	   	However 	the	point	estimates	for	outpatient	expenditures	were	quite	
big	in	absolute	terms 	For	the	disaggregated	expenditure	components	 summarized	in	Tables	 	and	
   	we saw sporadic	statistically	significant	negative	coefficients 	Here 	one	has	to	keep	in	mind	that	
we	had	far	less	observations	available	to	estimate	these	long run	coefficients 	This	increases	the	




Heterogenous	 effects	 for	 sub populations 	 In	 order	 to	 explore	 whether	 screening	
participation	has	different	effects	across	sub populations 	we	re ran	our	analysis	for	important	sub 
samples	along	the	dimensions	sex 	age	and 	employment 	In	each	case	we	had	a	strong	first stage	
a n d 	v e r y 	c o m p a r a b l e 	p a t t e r n s 	i n 	t h e 	s e c o n d   s t a g e   	T h a t 	m e a n s   	f or	 each	 sub population 	 we	
observed	an	increase	in	short run	cost 	a	decrease	in	medium run	cost 	no	significant	effects	on	
                                                 
26 In addition, we split the sample into an older cohort (birth year 1942 and older) and a younger cohort (birth year 
1943 and younger). For the older cohort, we observed higher short-run expenditures and higher medium-run 
savings. Qualitatively, however, we did not find a systematic difference between these two subsamples. A similar 
procedure was applied for a split sample of women and men. In this case, we observed stronger effects for men.   	
 
long run	cost 	and	no	impact	on	the	incidence	of	sick	leave 	However 	the	size	of	the	estimated	
coefficients	  and	 also	 their	 statistical	 significance 	 varied	 across	 sub populations 	 The	 most	
important	distinction	to	make	is	between	the	effects	for	younger	versus	older	insurants 	Table	 	
summarizes	these	results	where	we	distinguished	between	younger	insurants	 born	    	or	later 	
and	older	insurants	 born	before	      	For	younger	insurants 	the	increase	in	short run	cost	was	
less	 pronounced 	 in	 particular 	 we	 did	 not	 find	 a	 significant	 in c r e a s e 	i n 	t h e 	i n c i d e n c e 	o f 	
hospitalization 	It	seems	that	younger	patients	got	less	 or	less	complicated 	follow up	medical	
treatments	after	a	general	health	screening 	However 	the	cost savings	in	the	medium	were	are	also	
less	pronounced	for	the	younger	cohorts 	




binary	indicator	for	whether	the	insurant	was	still	alive	in	the	year	       	Given	that	mortality	
crucially	depends	on	age 	we	ran	separate	regressions	for	three	birth	cohort	groups	 born	before	
     	 between	     	 and	      	 and	 between	     	 and	       	 Following	 Angrist	        	 we	
estimated	a	linear	probability	model	of	mortality	for	each	birth	cohort	group	in	which	we	used	all	
i n s u r a n t s 	wh o 	w e r e 	pe r m a n e n t l y 	in s u r e d 	b e t w e e n 	        	a n d 	          	A s	 the	 variable	 of	 primary	
interest 	we	included	the	number	of	screenings	carried	out	in	this	time	span 	which	varied	between	
z e r o 	a n d 	s i x   	A s 	b e f o r e   	w e 	u s e d 	o u r 	p r o x y 	f o r 	t h e 	e x p o s u r e 	t o 	supply side	 screening	
recommendations	to	instrument	for	actual	screening	participation 	In	contrast	to	the	panel	data	
framework	above 	we	used	the	average	exposure	over	a	treatment	period	defined	as	    	to	     	
The	F statistics	on	the	excluded	instrument	 from	the	first	stage 	support	again	the	strength	of	our	
instrument 	as	can	be	seen	in	the	lower	panel	of	Table	  	As	further	control	variables 	we	included	
information	 on	 the	 insurant s	 age 	 sex 	 nationality 	 education 	G P 	i n 	t h e 	y e a r 	          	a n d 	t h e 	
exemption	of	the	prescription	charge 	which	served	as	a	proxy	for	income 	
The	upper	 panel	of	 Table	 	summarizes	the	estimation	results	of	t he 	se co n d	st a ge 	a nd	
reports	corresponding	OLS	estimates	for	comparison 	Interestingly 	the	OLS	estimates	suggest	a	
life prolonging	effect	of	screening 	Depending	on	the	birth	cohort	group 	an	additional	screening	
participation	is	associated	with	an	increased	likelihood	of	being	alive	in	    	between	one	and	four	
percentage	points 	In	contrast 	the	IV	estimates	do	not	show	any	statistically	significant	effect	of	
screening	 on	mortality 	These	results	suggest	that	 healthy	 insurants	self select	themselves	into	
treatment 	while	screening	itself	exerts	no	significant	effect	on	mortality 	
Interpretation	of	results 	We	found	a	clear	increase	in	short run	health	care	costs	 inpatient	
and	outpatient 	that	is	followed	by	medium run	decreases	in	the	outpatient	sector 	In	the	long	run 	
                                                 
  	The	year	    	is	the	latest	year	for	which	mortality	data	are	available    	
 
w e 	d i d 	n o t 	f i n d 	a n y 	s t a t i s t i c a l l y 	s i g n i f i c a n t 	c o s t 	e f f e c t s   	I n 	order	 to	 evaluate	 the	 overall	 cost	
effectiveness	of	the	screening	program 	we	had	to	add	all	the	point	estimates	for	the	lags	zero	to	
eight	 as	presented	in	Table	   	This	gives	an	aggregate	effect	of	about	     	for	outpatient	health	
care	costs	and	of	about	 	days	in	inpatient	care 	For	the	screening	participation	to	be	cost neutral 	a	
day	in	the	hospital	must	cost	less	than	     	While	we	cannot	monetize	the	cost	of	a	hospital	day	
caused	by	screening 	we	know	that	a	day	in	the	hospital	costs	on	average	between	    	and	     	
This	means	that	according	to	our	estimates 	screening	participation	clearly	increases	health	costs 	
The	same	qualitative	result	arises	if	we	consider	only	statistically	significant	point	estimates 	in	this	




measured	by	the	incidence	of	sick	leave	or	mortality 	The	only	sub population 	for	which	the	cost	
savings	in	the	medium run	could	overcompensate	the	increase	in	short run	costs 	is	the	one	of	
younger	insurants 	Here 	the	threshold	for	cost neutrality	is	    	of	hospital	costs	per	day 	if	we	
consider	all	coefficients   	Several	explanations	exist	for	our	empirical	pattern 	
	 i 	Doctors 	strong	risk	aversion	may	lead	to	substantial	overtreatment	 especially	of	older	
patients  	 This	 could	 explain	 the	 short run	 increase	 in	 expenditures	 without	 improvement	 of	
patients 	 health 	 However 	 this	 reason	 cannot	 explain	 the	 decreasing	 mid term	 effects	 on	
expenditures 	




for	 resident	 doctors	 to	 raise	 their	 income 	 Furthermore 	 GPs	 prescribe	 additional	 drugs 	 in	
particular	for	the	treatment	of	high	cholesterol 	mental	illness 	and	medications	for	the	genito 
urinary	 and	 musculo skeletal	 systems 	 Whether	 the	 lion s	 share	 of	 this	 increase	 is	 medically	
justified 	or	if	many	of	these	prescriptions	are	supply determined 	cannot	be	clearly	answered	by	
our	 data 	 Whereas	 the	 supply determined	 argument	 can	 at	 least	 partly	 explain	 our	 empirical	
pattern 	there	are	also	counter	arguments 	According	to	column	 	in	Table	  	GPs	do	not	increase	
their	own	income	by	screening induced	medical	treatment	in	the	immediate	and	the	subsequent	
year 	 Generally 	 we	 do	 not	 observe	 a	 remarkable	 increase	 of	 short run	 therapeutic	 services	 by	
medical	specialists	  Other  	in	the	year	of	screening 	Moreover 	supply side	effects	alone	cannot	
explain	the	decrease	of	mid term	expenditures	either 	
                                                 
28 Since we did not find any significant coefficient for hospital days for this sub-population (see Table 7), we cannot 
compute a cost-neutrality threshold of hospital costs. However, screening participation would reduce outpatient 
expenditures by €195 for younger insurants.   	
 
 iii 	Patients 	behavior	may	explain	the	screening driven	patterns	in	health	expenditures 	
Suppose	a	person	has	joined	the	screening	program	in	the	recent	past	and	no	medical	troubles	have	
been	 found 	 After	 the	 screening 	 the	 patient	 is	 confronted	 with	 health	 problems	 that	 are	 not	
necessarily	 serious 	 Given	 that	 the	 good	 health	 of	 the	 same	 person	 has	 been	 attested	 through	
screening	in	the	recent	past 	the	patient	may	forego	medical	consultation	in	this	case 	Consequently 	
individuals 	expenditures	for	drugs	and	medical	attendance	may	decrease	in	a	certain	period	after	
screening 	 We	 call	 this	 phenomenon	 the	  reassurance	 effect 	 of	 screening	 participation 	 The	





 iv 	The	pattern	of	short term	increases	and	medium term	decreases	in	health	expenditures	
may	also	display	the	intended	screening	effects 	Even	if	one	has	to	accept	an	increase	in	short term	
cost	 i e  	diseases	are	detected	and	treated	at	an	early	stage  	the	expenses	in	the	medium	run	
would	 decrease	 if	 more	 expensive	 treatments	 at	 a	 later	 stage	 of	a 	d i s e a s e 	c a n 	b e 	p r e v e n t e d   	
Similarly 	a	change	in	lifestyle	induced	by	the	screening	examination	could	explain	our	empirical	
results 	A	sustainable	change	in	lifestyle	accompanied	by	preventive	health	investments	such	as	
smoking	 cessation 	 less	 alcohol	 consumption 	 a	 more	 healthy	 diet 	 and	 more	 intensive	 sports	
activities	 would	 improve	 health	 and 	 consequently 	 can	 be	 expected	 to	 decrease	 health	
e x p e n d i t u r e s   	I n 	e i t h e r 	c a s e   	w e 	w o u l d 	e x p e c t 	i m p r o v e m e n t s 	i n 	t h e 	h e a l t h 	s t a t u s 	o f 	t r e a t e d 	
individuals 	If	we	interpret	the	number	of	sick	days 	mortality 	and	hospitalization	as	acceptable	
indicators	for	individual	health 	the	hypothesis	that	significant	health	improvements	are	due	to	
screening	 participation	 cannot	 be	 supported	 in	 the	 empirical	 analysis 	The	short run	impact	of	
screening	on	hospitalization	is	even	positive 	and	the	effect	on	absenteeism	remains	insignificant	
for	all	periods 	Hence 	we	do	not	observe	the	expected	changes	in	health status	variables 	However 	
our	measures	of	individual	health	may	indicate	severe	health	problems 	Hospital	days 	days	of	sick	
l e a v e   	a n d 	o b v i o u s l y 	m o r t a l i t y 	r e p r e s e n t 	v a r i a b l e s 	t h a t 	c a p t u r e 	 serious	 health	 troubles	 only 	






utilization	recorded	by	a	mandatory	regional	sickness	fund	over	a	   year	period 	we	estimated	the	
effects	of	a	general	health screening	program	in	Austria	on	individuals 	subsequent	health	care	
costs	and	health	status 	The	empirical	identification	is	based	on	a	panel	IV	estimation	that	exploited	  	
 
e x o g e n o u s 	v a r i a t i o n 	i n 	l o c a l 	e x p o s u r e 	t o 	s u p p l y   s i d e 	s c r e e n i n g 	recommendations 	 The	 broad	
v a r i e t y 	o f 	o u t c o m e 	v a r i a b l e s 	  e x p e n s e s 	f o r 	m e d i c a l 	a t t e n d a n c e 	a nd	 drugs 	 hospitalization 	 sick	
leave 	and	mortality 	allowed	a	comprehensive	evaluation 		
	 We	found	that	screening	participation	of	an	average	insurant	substantially	increased	health	
care	 costs	 up	 to	 two	 years	 after	 treatment 	 Inpatient	 and	 outpatient	 medical	 care	 increased	
temporarily	up	to	  	percent 	This	short run	increase	in	health	care	cost	was	not	compensated	by	





the	 short run	 rise	 in	 health	 care	 costs 	 The	 general	 screening	 examination	 led	 to	 substantial	
increases	in	intake	of	medical	drugs	and	further	medical	examinations 	In	contrast 	the	medium run	
d e c l i n e 	i n 	o u t p a t i e n t 	h e a l t h 	c a r e 	c o s t s 	m a y 	h a v e 	a t 	l e a s t 	t w o 	d i f f e r e n t 	s o u r c e s   	T h e 	e m p i r i c a l 	
evidence	is	consistent	with	successful	secondary	and or	primary	prevention 	as	well	as	with	a	




status 	 we	 consider	 the	 reassurance	 effect	 as	 the	 more	 likely	 explanation	 for	 the	 decrease	 in	
medium run	health	care	costs 	This	interpretation	is	also	supported	by	the	fact	that	the	decline	in	
medium run	health	care	costs	comes	from	the	outpatient	and	not	the	inpatient	sector 	where	the	
former	is	more	amenable	to	demand driven	consumption 	However 	we	have	to	acknowledge	that	
our	 health	 status	 measurements	 mainly	 target	 more	 serious	 health	 conditions 	 and	 minor	
improvements	in	health	may	remain	undisclosed 	
In	summary 	screening	increases	health	care	costs	on	average	and	does	not	improve	health 	
This	 empirical	 evidence	 corroborates	 the	 most	 recent	 screening	 literature	 that 	 in	 contrast	 to	
earlier	 studies 	 is	 more	 skeptical	 about	 the	 overall	 cost	 effectiveness	 of	 health	 screening 	 To	
Austrian	health	policy makers	we	would	recommend	to	abolish	the	program	in	its	current	form	or	
to	revise	it 	In	particular 	we	suggest	to	focus	on	younger	insurants	 about	sixty	years	of	age	or	
younger  	since	we	found	comparably	small	short run	cost	increases	for	this	group	that	can	be	
overcompensated	by	cost savings	in	the	medium	run 		
The	following	proposals	for	improvement	should	be	considered	in	implementing	 general 	
health	 screening	 programs 	  i 	 Given	 the	 increase	 of	 short run	 outpatient	 expenditures 	 the	
efficiency	of	a	program	can	be	improved	by	a	reduction	of	false	positive	diagnoses	and	subsequent	
overtreatment 	 A	 more	 precise	 program	 differentiation	 according	 to	 patients 	 age	 and	 gender 
specific	 risk	 factors	 would	 allow	 more	 target based	 medical	 exam i n a t i o n s   	M o r e o v e r   	b a s e d 	o n 	  	
 
these	specific	risk	factors 	binding	diagnostic	guidelines	could	be	established 	 ii 	A	well designed	
program	 should	 focus	 on	 health promoting	 achievements 	 In	 light	 of	 recent	 epidemiological	
developments	  e g  	 obesity    	 more	 effective	 lifestyle counseling	 measures	 could	 be	 discussed 	
Screening	guidelines	that	include	realistic	and	achievable	lifestyle	objectives 	in	combination	with	
financial	incentives	for	patients 	should	be	stipulated 	 iii 	Finally 	programs	should	be	flexible	and	
react	to	the	divergence	between	the	original	intentions	of	the	program	and	its	real life	practice 	
This	implies 	of	course 	a	constant	and	careful	evaluation 	Targeted	guidelines	for	further	medical	
treatment	are	necessary 	especially	with	regard	to	diseases	that	are	given	a	high	priority	in	the	
program s	objectives 	For	instance 	disorders	of	the	heart	and	circulatory	system	are	at	the	core	of	
the	Austrian	general	health screening	program 	However 	with	the	exception	of	cholesterol	drugs 	
we	 hardly	 find	 significant	 changes	 in	 cardio	 and	 circulatory	 medicines	 after	 the	 screening	




                                                 
  	For	literature	on	obesity 	see	for	instance	Baum	and	Ruhm	       	Bhattacharya	and	Bundorf	       	
Bhattacharya	and	Sood	          	
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Figure	  	Screening	participation	rate	in	Austria	by	sex 	         	
	  	
 
Table	  	Mean	and	standard	deviation	of	screening	participation	and	health	outcomes	 by	age	group a	
	 	
	 Overall Age	groups
	                            
		
Participation	rateb                                    
	
Outpatient	                                           
Expenditures	                                                          
	
		Medical	                                          
		Attendance	                                                      
	
		Medical	                                          
		Drugs	                                                       
	
Days	of	                              
Hospitalization	                                             
	
Days	of	sick	leave                                  
                                               
	
Mortality	                              
	
	




based	on	an	unbalanced	panel	data	set	covering	the	period	from	    	through	     	The	first	column	gives	the	numbers	for	
all	insurants	   	years	of	age	or	older  	Columns	three	to	seven	give	the	figures	by	age	group 	Monetary	values	are	adjusted	
for	inflation	and	expressed	in	    	Euros 	Note 	insurants	contribute	up	to	ten	observations 	and	may	be	represented	in	up	
to	two	age	groups 	This	does	not	apply	to	the	outcome	mortality 	which	gives	the	relative	share	of	insurants	of	each	age	
group	that	had	passed	away	by	the	end	of	     	
b	in	    	
	  	
 





First	and	second	consultation in	a	quarter            
Consultation	from	third	visit in	a	quarter	onwards      	    
Therapeutic	counsel           
Sonography          
Home	visit           
 	
Cardiopulmonary	resuscitation	at	the	location	of	the	
accident           
 	
Screening           
	
a	This	table	provides	fees	paid	by	the	Upper	Austrian	Sickness	Fund	for	different	types	of	services	by	
GPs 	and	the	respective	percentage	of	GP s	total	income 		  	
 






minus	one 	This	map	shows	the	average	of	these	annual	values	from	the	years	    	through	     		  	
 
Table	  	Firsts	stage	resultsa	
L a g 	 r 	 	          
Total	sample 	
Coefficient	of IV                                             
Cragg Donald	Wald	F	statistic	                                                                   
Number	of	obervations	                                                                                        
Number	of	individuals	                                                                        
Average	no  of obs 	per	indiv 	                                             
Sub sample	of	insurants	with	employment	spells
Coefficient	of IV                                             
Cragg Donald	Wald	F	statistic	                                                             
Number	of	obervations	                                                                                  
Number	of	individuals	                                                                        
Average	no  of obs 	per	indiv 	                                             
	
a	The	dependent	variable	is	a	binary	variable	equal	to	one	if	the	insurant	participated	in	the	general	health	screening	in	the	quarter	t r 	In	addition	to	the	instrumental	
variable	 IV  	each	estimation	controls	also	for	the	insurant s	age	as	well	as	insurants 	and	GPs 	fixed	effects 	The	IV	is	a	proxy	for	the	exposure	to	supply side	screening	
recommendations	and	is	defined	as	the	sum	of	all	screenings	prescribed	by	all	GPs	located	in	a	given	zip	code	area	consumed	by	any	insurant 	minus	the	potential	




Table	  	Effect	of	screening	participation	 r	years	ago 	on	different	health	outcomesa	
	
Lag	r Outpatient	expenditures Medical	attendance Medical	drugs Days	of	hospitalization Days	of	sick	leave	
	 OLS	 IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV	
		 	
 	         	                                      	                                       	
	       	                                                                  	
 	        	                                                                      	
	       	                                                                   	
 	      	                                                           	
	       	                                                                 	
 	      	                                                                	
	       	                                                                  	
 	      	                                                                      	
	       	                                                                  	
 	     	                                                                	
	       	                                                                   	
 	     	                                                         	
	       	                                                                    	
 	      	                                                        	
	       	                                                                    	
 	      	                                                           	
	       	                                                                      	
Mean       	                         
	
a	This	table	summarizes	estimation	results	on	the	effect	of	screening	participation	 r	years	ago 	on	five	different	health	outcomes	based	on	two	methods	of	estimation 	
ordinary	least	squares	 OLS 	and	two stage	least	squares	 IV  	Each	entry	reflects	a	separate	estimation 	The	outcome	variables	outpatient	expenditures	and	the	two	sub 
components	expenditures	for	medical	attendance	and	medical	drugs	are	measured	in	    	Euros 	The	outcome	variables	hospitalization	and	sick	leave	are	measured	in	days	
per	year 	In	the	IV	estimations 	screening	participation	is	instrumented	by	a	proxy	for	the	exposure	to	supply side	screening	recommendations	that	varies	over	zip	code	
a r e a s 	a n d 	t i m e 	  s e e 	F i g u r e 	      	A 	s u m m a r y 	o f 	t h e 	f i r s t   s t a g e 	r e s u l t s 	i s 	p r o v i d e d 	i n 	T a b l e 	    	S t a n d a r d 	e r r o r s 	a r e 	r o b u s t 	t o 	c l u s tering	 at	 the	 individual	 level	 and	 to	
heteroskedasticity	of	unknown	form 	  	   	and	   	indicate	statistical	significance	at	the	   percent	level 	  percent	level 	and	  percent	level 	Each	estimation	controls	also	
for	insurant	fixed	effects 	GP	fixed	effects 	year	fixed	effects 	and	the	insurant s	age 	
	  	
 
Table	  	Effect	of	screening	participation	 r	years	ago 	on	expenditures	for	medical	drugs	by	categorya	
	
Lag Cardio	 Cancer Nervous Metabolism Blood Dermatological Genito urinary
 ATC	C 	  ATC	L   ATC	N   ATC	A   ATC	B   ATC D   ATC G 
	
         	                                         
       	                                             
        	                                         
       	                                             
        	                                     
       	                                             
       	                                           
       	                                              
         	                                                
       	                                             
         	                                              
       	                                              
         	                                       
       	                                              
         	                                     
       	                                              
         	                                    
       	                                               
		











infectives Musculo skeletal Antiparasitic Respiratory Sensory Various Missingb
 ATC	H 	  ATC	J   ATC	M   ATC	P   ATC	R   ATC	S   ATC	V 
	
       	                                                 
       	                                                   
       	                                         
       	                                                   
       	                                         
       	                                                   
       	                                                  
       	                                                   
      	                                                
       	                                                   
       	                                                   
      	                                                   
       	                                               
       	                                                   
       	                                       
       	                                                    
        	                                              
       	                                                    
Mean     	                                        
	
a	This	table	summarizes	estimation	results	on	the	effect	of	screening	participation	 r	years	ago 	on	expenditures	for	medical	drugs	of	selected	
categories	  measured	 in	     	 Euros 	 based	 on	 two stage	 least	 squares	  IV 	 estimation 	 Each	 entry	 reflects	 a	 separate	 estimation   	I n 	t h e 	I V 	
estimations 	screening	participation	is	instrumented	by	a	proxy	for	the	exposure	to	supply side	screening	recommendations	that	varies	over	zip	code	
areas	and	time	 see	Figure	   	A	summary	of	the	first stage	results	is	provided	in	Table	  	Standard	errors	are	robust	to	clustering	at	the	individual	
level	and	to	heteroskedasticity	of	unknown	form 	  	   	and	   	indicate	statistical	significance	at	the	   percent	level 	  percent	level 	and	  percent	
level 	Each	estimation	controls	also	for	insurant	fixed	effects 	GP	fixed	effects 	year	fixed	effects 	and	the	insurant s	age 	ATC	stands	for	Anatomical	
Therapeutic	Chemical	 ATC 	Classification	System 	b	For	drugs	in	the	 missing 	category 	ATC Codes	are	not	available 	  	
 
Table	  	Effect	of	screening	participation	 r	years	ago 	on	expenditures	for	medical	attendance	by	fielda	
	
Lag	 GP	 Radiologist Laboratory Internist Urologist Gynecologist Dermatologist
		
 	                                                      
	                                                 
 	                                                         
	                                                 
 	                                                            
	                                                 
 	                                                         
	                                                 
 	                                                   
	                                                 
 	                                                    
	                                                  
 	                                                  
	                                                  
 	                                             
	                                                   
 	                                        
	                                                    
		 	




Table	 	continued 	Effect	of	screening	participation	 r	years	ago 	on	expenditures	for	medical	attendance	by	fielda	
	
Lag	 Pulmonologist Neurologist ENT Orthopedist	 Oculist Physiotheraphy Other
		
 	                                                 
	                                                  
 	                                                 
	                                                  
 	                              	                     
	                                                  
 	                          	                     
	                                                  
 	                                               
	                                                  
 	                                                   
	                                                  
 	                                           
	                                                   
 	                                  	                  
	                                                   
 	                                                   
	                                                     
		
Mean	                                       
	
a	This	table	summarizes	estimation	results	on	the	effect	of	screening	participation	 r	years	ago 	on	expenditures	for	medical	
attendance	of	selected	specialists	 measured	in	    	Euros 	based	on	two stage	least	squares	 IV 	estimation 	Each	entry	reflects	
a	separate	estimation 	In	the	IV	estimations 	screening	participation	is	instrumented	by	a	proxy	for	the	exposure	to	supply side	
screening	recommendations	that	varies	over	zip	code	areas	and	time	 see	Figure	   	A	summary	of	the	first stage	results	is	
provided	in	Table	  	Standard	errors	are	robust	to	clustering	at	the	individual	level	and	to	heteroskedasticity	of	unknown	form 	  	
   	and	   	indicate	statistical	significance	at	the	   percent	level 	  percent	level 	and	  percent	level 	Each	estimation	controls	
also	for	insurant	fixed	effects 	GP	fixed	effects 	year	fixed	effects 	and	the	insurant s	age 	  	
 
Table	  	Effect	of	screening	participation	 r	years	ago 	on	different	health	outcomes	 younger	and	older	subsamples a	
	
Lag	r Outpatient	expenditures Medical	attendance Medical	drugs Days	of	hospitalization Days	of	sick	leave	
	 Younger	 Older Younger Older Younger	 Older Younger Older Younger
		 	
 	       	                                                          
	        	                                                            
 	      	                                                        
	        	                                                            
 	      	                                                
	        	                                                            
 	       	                                                        
	        	                                                            
 	          	                                       	                            
	         	                                                             
 	        	                                                              
	         	                                                               
 	       	                                                     
	         	                                                               
 	        	                                                      
	         	                                                               
 	        	                                                        
	         	                                                                  
	
Mean       	                                                   
	
a	This	table	summarizes	estimation	results	on	the	effect	of	screening	participation	 r	years	ago 	on	five	different	health	outcomes	based	on	two stage	least	squares	 IV 	
estimation 	Each	entry	reflects	a	separate	estimation 	The	outcome	variables	outpatient	expenditures	and	the	two	sub components	expenditures	for	medical	attendance	and	
medical	 drugs	 are	 measured	 in	     	 Euros 	 The	 outcome	 variables	h o s p i t a l i z a t i o n 	a n d 	s i c k 	l e a v e 	a r e 	m e a s u r e d 	i n 	d a y s 	p e r 	y e a r   	In	 the	 IV	 estimations 	 screening	
participation	is	instrumented	by	a	proxy	for	the	exposure	to	supply side	screening	recommendations	that	varies	over	zip	code	areas	and	time	 see	Figure	   	A	summary	of	
the	first stage	results	is	provided	in	Table	  	Standard	errors	are	robust	to	clustering	at	the	individual	level	and	to	heteroskedasticity	of	unknown	form 	  	   	and	   	indicate	
statistical	significance	at	the	   percent	level 	  percent	level 	and	  percent	level 	Each	estimation	controls	also	for	insurant	fixed	effects 	GP	fixed	effects 	year	fixed	effects 	





                        	or	before
OLS IV OLS	 IV OLS IV
Coeff 	of	screening	                      	                    
                    	                     
First	Stage	Regression
Coeff  of	instrument		                        
Cragg Donald	Wald	F	statistic                  
Observations	                     	                     
	
a	 Estimation	 method 	 linear	 probability	 model 	 Data	 structure 	 cross	 section 	 Standard	 errors	 are	 robust	 but	 not	
clustered 	Other	controls 	doctor 	age 	and	zip	code	area	dummies 	dummies	for	foreign	nationality 	academic	degree 	sex 	
and	exemption	of	prescription	charge 	
	
	